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THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF AGENCY ACTIONS
Jason Marisam*
U.S. agencies routinely base their domestic regulations on international
considerations, such as the benefits of coordinating American and foreign
standards or the foreign policy advantages of a particular policy. I refer to
this phenomenon as the internationalization of agency actions. This Article
examines what the internationalization of agency actions means for agency
decision-making processes, institutional design, and legal doctrine. It
creates a stylized model of how agencies determine whether to coordinate
their standards with foreign regulations. Among other institutional design
findings, it shows that court opinions that reduce the stringency of judicial
review when agencies implement internationally coordinated standards
make such coordination more likely to occur, but they simultaneously
deprive the executive of bargaining power because U.S. agencies cannot
credibly threaten that any coordinated agreement must align more closely
with U.S. values or risk being overturned in U.S. courts. This Article also
develops a taxonomy of international factors relied on by agencies and
applies that taxonomy to help clarify the doctrinal issue of whether and
when agencies can use international factors to justify their actions in court.
This taxonomical approach shows how the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Massachusetts v. EPA can reasonably be read to allow agencies to invoke a
far broader range of foreign policy rationales than some prevailing views
suggest.
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INTRODUCTION
In nearly every area of domestic regulatory law, agencies today base their
regulations in part on international considerations, such as the benefits of
harmonizing U.S. and foreign standards or the foreign policy advantages of
a particular policy. I refer to this phenomenon as the internationalization of
agency actions.
For a smattering of examples from the Obama
Administration, consider the following proposed or final rulemakings:
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently proposed strict
limits on greenhouse gas emissions from new coal plants in part because
doing so would “demonstrate global leadership” on climate change and
signal to China a U.S. commitment to the collaborative development of
carbon capture technology.1
The Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board
established capital ratio standards for banks that were “measured in a
manner consistent with the international leverage ratio” set by a group of
international regulators known as the Basel Committee.2
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has proposed “requiring that
dates on medical device labels conform to a standard format consistent with
international standards and international practice” in order to streamline
U.S. and international medical device labels.3
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has adopted safety
standards that “provide consistency between domestic and international
efforts for security of radioactive materials that are deemed to be attractive
targets for malevolent use.”4
The Department of Labor has proposed that the labeling of hazardous
chemicals in workplaces must “conform with” a recommended
classification system set by the United Nations.5
The internationalization of agency actions is due, in large part, to the
growing number of regulatory issues that demand international cooperation
and coordination in our globalized age.6 In 2012, international cooperation
received a boost from President Obama’s landmark Executive Order
1. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED STANDARDS OF
PERFORMANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOR NEW STATIONARY SOURCES: ELECTRIC
UTILITY GENERATING UNITS (2013), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201309/documents/20130920proposalria.pdf.
2. Regulatory Capital Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 62,018, 62,022 (Oct. 11, 2013).
3. Unique Device Identification System, 78 Fed. Reg. 58,786, 58,787 (Sept. 24, 2013).
4. Physical Protection of Byproduct Material, 78 Fed. Reg. 16,922, 16,926 (Mar. 19,
2013).
5. Hazard Communication, 74 Fed. Reg. 50,280 (Sept. 30, 2009).
6. See David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91
WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 69 (2013).
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13,609, which tasks agencies with considering the “international impacts”
of significant rulemakings and pursuing “international regulatory
cooperation” when addressing shared regulatory issues.7 As a result, we
can expect this internationalization trend to continue and gain in
prominence.
This Article examines what the internationalization of agency actions
means for agency decision-making processes, institutional design, and legal
doctrine. In doing so, this Article makes several descriptive and normative
claims that contribute to several strands and fields of legal scholarship.
First, the Article contributes to traditional administrative law doctrine by
offering a clearer understanding of when agencies can rely on international
considerations to justify their actions in court. This Article develops a
taxonomy of international factors relied on by agencies and scours the case
law to determine which factors courts presumptively allow agencies to
consider in the absence of express congressional authorization.8 I then
apply these findings to offer a fresh interpretation of the U.S. Supreme
Court opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA.9 While some have read this case as
prohibiting agencies from invoking foreign policy considerations to justify
their actions,10 I suggest a narrower reading that only prohibits agencies
from relying on one type of foreign policy consideration identified in the
taxonomy—namely, agencies cannot base their actions on the effects they
have on international negotiations.11 Even here, though, I suggest that such
effects may be considered if the regulatory agency consults with the
Department of State or other diplomatic experts.12 Not only would this
reading of Massachusetts v. EPA allow agencies to invoke a broader range
of foreign policy rationales generally, it would have the immediate and
specific effect of making it more likely that a court will accept as legitimate
the foreign policy considerations underlying the EPA’s recent action on
climate change.
Second, this Article contributes significantly to the global administrative
law literature. Global administrative law focuses on the processes,
procedures, and substantive outcomes of international regulatory regimes.13
7. Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413, 26,414 (May 1, 2012). This
Executive Order is the first presidential executive order that tasks agencies with international
regulatory cooperation, a recommendation first made in 1991, see Recommendations of the
Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure, 56 Fed. Reg.
33,841 (July 24, 1991), but not effected until nearly twenty-one years later, see Press
Release, Executive Order Signed Based on Administrative Conference Recommendation
(May 9, 2012), available at http://www.acus.gov/newsroom/news/executive-order-signedbased-administrative-conference-recommendation.
8. See infra Parts I, III.
9. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
10. See infra Part III.C.
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 294, 318–320 (2006); David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in
International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547 (2005) [hereinafter Zaring, Informal].
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The subfield was launched because traditional administrative law paradigms
were formed with domestic law in mind and could not account for
international developments.14 To the extent that the subfield has focused on
the domestic level, it has typically been either to assess how U.S.
administrative law can inform international administrative practices15 or to
show how international regulatory regimes affect substantive decision
making by domestic agencies.16
This Article engages in an institutional analysis that shows how the
causal chain runs in the other direction too—that is, domestic administrative
law can affect substantive decision making at the international level.17 For
example, in several opinions, courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction
over some agency decisions that involve the negotiation and
implementation of international agreements coordinating foreign and U.S.
regulations.18 One effect of these opinions is to give the executive branch a
freer hand to bargain with other nations and not worry that courts will veto
the international arrangements. But at the same time these judicial
decisions undermine the executive’s bargaining power because they make it
harder for the executive to credibly claim that any agreement must align
more closely with U.S. values and preferences or risk being overturned in
U.S. courts.
Third, this Article contributes to the international law and international
affairs literature on costly signaling theory.19 This theory explains how, in
the midst of international negotiations, state actors behave in ways that send
signals of their foreign policy intentions to other nations, which observe the
signals and adjust their negotiating positions accordingly.20 The literature
has focused on signals sent through actions by Congress and the President.
This Article shows how such signals are now being sent through agency
actions. The most recent example comes from the EPA’s proposal to
regulate climate change in part because of the “leadership” that it would
demonstrate globally.21
14. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).
15. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global
Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2005).
16. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S.
Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695 (2005); Joel P. Trachtman,
International Legal Control of Domestic Administrative Action (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=joel_trachtman.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY (2008); Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An
Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229
(2004); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999); Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An
Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005); Kal Raustiala, Form
and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581 (2005).
20. See infra Part I.D.
21. See EPA, supra note 1.
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Finally, this Article contributes incidentally to the federalism literature.
Some scholars have argued against the federal preemption of state law on
the grounds that preemption blocks policymaking at the state level and thus
deprives federal policymakers of a valuable source of information about
which policies work best.22 Without state policy experiments, the argument
goes, federal policymakers such as agencies will have a harder time
identifying the optimal policy.23 This Article shows that this argument
against preemption has far less purchase in today’s globalized world. U.S.
agencies and their foreign counterparts often face similar problems.24 As a
result, when state-level regulations are preempted or otherwise nonexistent,
U.S. agencies can still learn by looking to policies enacted overseas.
This Article proceeds as follow. Part I provides a taxonomy of the
international factors that agencies consider when taking regulatory action.
Part II examines a common dilemma faced by agencies: whether to
coordinate their standards with international or foreign regulators. This part
creates a stylized model of agency decision making under this dilemma. It
then discusses how domestic institutions can be designed to make it more
likely that agencies will engage in beneficial coordination with foreign
regulators or that such coordination will align with U.S. preferences. This
part shows that there is a trade-off between international coordination and
the U.S. agency’s bargaining advantage. Domestic institutional designs that
make coordination more likely simultaneously reduce U.S. agencies’
bargaining power over their foreign counterparts. Part III discusses the
current doctrine on whether agencies can rely on international factors to
support their actions in court. It suggests narrow readings of Massachusetts
v. EPA that keep intact a presumption developed by the D.C. Circuit that
agencies can rely on such factors, even in the absence of express
congressional authorization.
I. A TAXONOMY OF AGENCIES’ INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
This part provides a taxonomy of the international considerations relied
on by agencies. I divide these considerations into four main types:
(A) international network effects, (B) international regulatory spillover
effects, (C) international epistemic factors, and (D) foreign affairs factors.
Each type is discussed in a section below. The taxonomy is designed to
improve the understanding of agency decision making regarding
international concerns generally. Identifying different types of international
considerations also produces a couple of interesting specific findings. It
shows that regulatory agencies are now engaging in the sort of costly
signals of foreign policy intent that have typically been ascribed to the
President and Congress, and it shows that agencies look to foreign

22. See, e.g., Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480
(2008).
23. See id.
24. See supra Part I.C.
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regulations as potential models in ways that complement how agencies
sometimes look to state-level regulations for guidance.
A. International Network Effects
When U.S. regulators and their foreign counterparts adopt the same
standard, this consistency produces efficiencies known as network effects.25
The potential to generate network effects often leads agencies to consider
whether they should coordinate their regulations with foreign standards.
This section discuses several types of benefits from network effects—
gains in international trade, reduced compliance and reporting costs for
firms, and reduced information and enforcement costs for agencies—and
illustrates how agencies consider these benefits.
1. Network Effects and Gains from International Trade
Gains from international trade are probably the most common network
effect considered by agencies.26 When U.S. and foreign regulations are
harmonized, it makes it easier to import and export goods among the
nations because manufacturers can make one product that satisfies the
multiple nations’ regulations. U.S. agencies often invoke this kind of
improved trading opportunity as a benefit of their policy choice.27 For
example, when the Department of Transportation promulgated a rule for
hydraulic brakes, it noted that its standards were the same as European
specifications and explained: “This will enable manufacturers to build
vehicles with standardized brake systems acceptable throughout the world,
thereby providing significant cost savings to vehicle buyers . . . and thereby
dismantl[ing] one of the most significant non-tariff barriers to international
motor vehicle trade.”28
Network effects leading to gains from trade are also generated when a
U.S. agency makes a finding that a foreign standard is of equivalent or
compatible stringency and thus compliance with the foreign standard will
be deemed sufficient to satisfy the U.S. standard.
Equivalency
determinations are often made as part of mutual recognition agreements in
which the U.S. and another nation agree that if a product or service meets
regulatory requirements in one jurisdiction, it then satisfies the
requirements of the other jurisdiction.29 For example, the FDA has

25. See George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game,
99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 567 n.117 (2005) (explaining that network effects “arise simply from
efficiencies due to consistency of arrangements”).
26. I have no strong empirical support for this proposition. It is merely my sense from
having read and searched through dozens of proposed and final rulemakings that purport to
rely on some international or foreign factor.
27. See, e.g., Pesticide Tolerance Grouping Program II, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,284, 76,288
(Dec. 8, 2010).
28. Federal Motor Safety Standards, 60 Fed. Reg. 6411, 6413 (Feb. 2, 1995).
29. See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition
Regimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 274–
75, 290 (2005).
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agreements with regulators in Canada that require each nation to accept the
other’s results from inspections for compliance with good manufacturing
practices.30 In effect, each nation’s regulators have agreed to deputize the
other nation’s regulators to act on their behalf. The outcome is that firms
with operations in each country can comply with their home nation’s
standards and at the same time satisfy regulators in the other nation.
Equivalency determinations can also occur on an ad hoc basis as
regulated entities push U.S. agencies to find that compliance with another
nation’s regulations will satisfy the agency’s own standards.31 For
example, car manufacturers often ask the Department of Transportation to
determine that various European standards are “functionally equivalent”
with U.S. standards.32 The carmakers lobby the agency for this finding
because they want to be able to sell cars in both American and European
markets without having to change safety specifications.
2. Network Effects and Compliance and Reporting Costs
Adopting consistent standards can also produce regulatory benefits by
reducing the resources that regulated firms must devote to compliance and
reporting. Firms operating in multiple jurisdictions are often subject to
conflicting requirements that require compiling unique sets of information
for each jurisdiction.33 However, if these jurisdictions coordinate their
requirements, the firms can avoid this burdensome work.34
The FDA used this logic to support its proposal to adopt safety reporting
requirements recommended by an international regulatory body, noting:
“Savings to the affected industry would accrue from more efficient
allocation of resources resulting from international harmonization of the
safety reporting requirements.”35 Similarly, to reduce reporting costs
through uniform standards, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
developed a “multijurisdictional disclosure system” that allows Canadian
issuers of securities to meet U.S. disclosure requirements “by providing

30. See Linda Horton, Mutual Recognition Agreements and Harmonization, 29 SETON
HALL L. REV. 692, 722 n.139 (1998).
31. See Nicolaidis & Shaffer, supra note 29, at 283 (noting that equivalency findings are
often the product of pressure from business interests).
32. See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,508 (May 24,
2000).
33. See Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the “Public Law Taboo” in International
Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255, 289 (1999) (noting that conflicting oversight of
businesses by different nations can produce “multiple, concurrent regulation of any given
international transaction”).
34. The same basic issue arises when firms are subject to oversight by multiple federal
agencies with overlapping jurisdiction. If these agencies adopt conflicting rules, it increases
reporting requirements for firms. Interagency coordination among the federal agencies can
help reduce these costs. See Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
181, 200–01, 223 (2011) (discussing the “burdens on regulated entities that must comply
with two agencies’ regulations”).
35. Safety Reporting Requirements for Human Drug and Biological Products, 67 Fed.
Reg. 74,112 (Dec. 9, 2002).
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disclosure documents prepared in accordance with the requirements of
Canadian regulatory authorities.”36
3. Network Effects and Information and Enforcement Costs
Coordination with foreign regulations can also generate network effects
that save resources for the agencies themselves. As more nations adhere to
a similar regulatory standard, it becomes increasingly valuable for U.S.
agencies to adopt the same standard because they can reap the benefits of
information-sharing and joint enforcement among the similarly situated
foreign regulators.37 As Kal Raustiala has explained: “[N]etwork effects
boost the existing incentives to standardize.”38 Thus, if SEC and Federal
Reserve Bank regulators are interested in creating a common standard with
other jurisdictions, these organizations can serve as the fora in which such a
standard is hammered out.39 Whatever standard is chosen has a good
chance of developing an adoptive momentum by virtue of the advantages
regulators see in being a part of the “network” of regulators applying the
same schema to their regulated industry.40
Capitalizing on this kind of network effect was one reason why the EPA
aligned its crop classification system with European standards.41 As the
EPA explained, harmonizing classifications “increased potential for
resource sharing between EPA and pesticide regulatory agencies in other
countries.”42 These resource savings can indirectly benefit the public
because less money must be drawn from the U.S. Treasury for the agency to
do its job, but the benefit first and foremost redounds to the agency, which
immediately has more resources to devote to its other regulatory tasks.43
B. International Regulatory Spillover Effects
Regulatory spillover effects exist whenever one nation’s regulations
substantially affect the well-being of another nation’s population.44 This
section first explains how spillover effects occur. It then illustrates how
36. Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and
Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, 55 Fed. Reg. 46,288 (Nov. 2, 1990).
37. See Zaring, Informal, supra note 13, at 591–92; see also Mariano-Florentino Cuellar,
The Mismatch Between State Power and State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement,
22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 15, 28–29 (2004) (describing how information and enforcement
costs lead to problems in international coordination among law enforcement agencies).
38. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 65 (2002).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Pesticide Tolerance Crop Grouping Program II, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,284, 76,288 (Dec. 8,
2010).
42. Id.
43. See Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 941–42
(2012) (explaining how, when an agency saves resources from one task, “the agency has
extra money to spend on something else”).
44. Cf. Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and . . . Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and
Subsidiarity, 9 EURO. J. INT’L L. 32, 34 (1998) (“[T]here are horizontal spillovers that cause
one group to be affected by the legal rules and policy decisions of another group.”).
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U.S. agencies take these effects into account by independently assessing
how their actions affect other nations and also how their actions could
protect the United States from spillover effects originating in other nations.
1. How Spillover Effects Occur
Many spillover effects occur because one nation’s regulations are set at
levels that do not adequately protect global public and common goods, such
as clean air, fisheries populations, and stable banking systems.45 If one
nation has lax pollution standards, people breathing in other nations can
suffer. If one nation allows voluminous fishing off its shores, the fish
stocks available for other nations will also be depleted. If one nation allows
its banks to take on excessive risk without adequate capital reserves, the
banks’ weaknesses can cause a chain of bad consequences that reaches
other nations’ banking systems.46 The problem from a governance
perspective is that nations have incentives to maintain inadequate
regulations that produce these kinds of risks because nations must absorb
the cost of enacting and enforcing their own stringent regulations, but they
only capture a fraction of the benefits, which are spread among all the
nations that enjoy the global public and common goods.47
Spillover effects are also generated by regulatory arbitrage. Professor
Victor Fleisher has recently defined regulatory arbitrage as “the
manipulation of the structure of a deal to take advantage of a gap between
the economic substance of a transaction and its regulatory treatment.”48
One key type of regulatory arbitrage arises when regulators in different
jurisdictions address the same subject matter differently.
This
inconsistency can give regulated actors the ability to choose which
regulatory regime they prefer and then locate or relocate their actions in that
jurisdiction. The outcome of this gamesmanship can be inefficient because
firms are likely to choose a jurisdiction with insufficiently stringent
regulations. Again, though, there is a governance problem because
individual nations have incentives to weaken their regulations to attract
individual businesses to their jurisdictions. These nations then reap much
of the wealth-generating benefits of having such businesses, while much of
the risk spills over to other nations.

45. See Gregory Shaffer, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal
Pluralist World, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669 (2012).
46. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198–200 (2008).
47. Cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 93–94
(1997) (“Because producers of biodiversity—that is, owners of land producing
biodiversity—capture at best only a small fraction of its benefits, no one has an adequate
incentive to produce that good in socially optimal quantities.”).
48. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 230 (2001); see also
Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L.
211, 211 n.1 (1997) (“‘Regulatory arbitrage’ refers to financial transactions designed to
reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by differential regulations or laws.”).
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2. Independently Assessing U.S.-Based Spillover Effects
U.S. agencies sometimes take into account spillover effects by
independently assessing how their regulations affect other nations. They
often do so for political reasons. By considering how their regulations
affect others, the U.S. agencies signal that they are not selfish actors but are
willing to cooperate in the protection of some global good. For example,
when the Federal Trade Commission was considering whether to license the
sale of nuclear material to another nation, it assessed the impact on the
“global commons”—that is, it considered how radiation leaks from the
nuclear material would affect global public health and the environment.49
The agency seemed to make the assessment because it was in the United
States’ interests to be seen as cooperating with international efforts to
responsibly manage the proliferation of nuclear material.50
Other times, these assessments are made because the agency has a legal
obligation to consider transnational harms. For example, the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires a federal agency “to the fullest
extent possible” to prepare “a detailed statement on . . . the environmental
impact” of “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.”51 A federal court has interpreted these provisions to
require the Department of Transportation to consider how its domestic
regulation of fuel efficiency standards for automobiles affects climate
change.52 The agency had argued to the court that it should not have to
assess climate change impacts precisely because “climate change is largely
a global phenomenon that includes actions that are outside of [the agency’s]
control.”53 However, the court held that the global nature “does not release
the agency from the duty of assessing the effects of its actions on global
warming within the context of other actions that also affect global
warming.”54 That is, to the extent that the agency’s regulatory standards
affected a global public good like the climate, the agency had to assess that
impact per Congress’s instruction in NEPA.

49. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 647 F.2d 1345,
1365–66 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
50. See infra Part III.B.1.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (2012).
52. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic and Safety Admin., 538
F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).
53. Id. at 1217. Professor Kevin Stack refers to this kind of argument as the “one
percent problem” because it involves actors deflecting responsibility for a problem by
arguing that they are only contributing a small amount to the problem. Kevin Stack &
Michael P. Vadenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (2011).
54. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1217. Agencies may be expressly
forbidden from considering such effects, too. For example, a federal court held that the
Department of the Interior must consider the local environmental impacts of its regulations
on offshore oil operations but that it was barred from considering the international or global
impacts because, when Congress passed the agency’s enabling statute, it was only concerned
with local effects. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 484–
85 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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3. Protecting the United States from Other Nations’ Spillover Effects
When regulatory agencies independently assess their own spillover
effects, such considerations help protect other nations from U.S. regulatory
behavior, but they do not necessarily help protect U.S. citizens from other
nations’ spillover effects. To limit these harms, agencies must convince
other nations to address their spillover effects. How can they do that? A
common approach is to reinforce or help form an international arrangement
whereby multiple nations adhere to common minimum standards that
reduce the spillover effects created by lax regulation.55 As Professor Ilan
Benshalom puts it, “Given their inability to satisfactorily govern complex
global issues by themselves, states have an incentive to better manage these
issues by coordinating their actions.”56 A recent example of this is the
agreement between China and the United States regarding climate change.
Announced by President Obama and President Xi Jinping on November 11,
2014, the two nations outlined a joint plan to curb carbon emissions, which
includes new carbon emissions reductions by the United States and a “firstever commitment by China to stop its emissions from growing by 2030.”57
Not only does the agreement allow the United States to limit the spillover
effects from China, but the coordinated effort between the two nations acts
to encourage other countries to make their own cuts in carbon emissions.58
The United States can help maintain such spillover-minimizing
arrangements by adhering to existing international arrangements and thus
encouraging others to do the same. When the United States agrees to enter
into an internationally coordinated agreement, other nations are likely to
follow for a couple of reasons. First, when increasing numbers of nations
agree to a common international standard, other nations may fear that they
will be punished or their reputation may suffer if they do not join.59 This
risk is particularly great when dominant nations such as the United States
are the ones pushing for international coordination.
Second, the
comparative costs of joining a coordinated arrangement decrease as more
nations adhere to that standard. If we assume that there is some resource
cost to joining an international arrangement because it entails maintaining
stricter regulations, some nations may balk at absorbing these costs because
they do not want to expend resources that other nations are saving by not
joining the arrangement. This concern about comparative resource savings
55. See Raustiala, supra note 38, at 27 (“[I]n the area of environmental protection, the
public goods nature of many environmental problems prompts states to negotiate collective,
often universal treaties that fit the liberal internationalist model well.”).
56. Ilan Benshalom, Rethinking International Distributive Justice: Fairness As
Insurance, 31 B.U. INT’L L.J. 267, 275 (2013).
57. Mark Landler, U.S. and China Reach Climate Accord After Months of Talks, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2014, at A1; see also Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The
White House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean
Energy Cooperation (Nov. 11, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/11/11/fact-sheet-us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-and-cleanenergy-c.
58. Landler, supra note 57.
59. See Benshalom, supra note 56, at 292 n.142.
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diminishes as more nations expend the resources needed to abide by the
international arrangement.60
This logic helps explain why U.S. agencies often abide by recommended
international standards governing spillover effects that they are under no
legal obligation to adopt. For example, spillover effects are generated when
individual nations do not adequately secure their nuclear material, creating
a risk that the material may be captured by terrorists and used in attacks
around the world. To minimize this risk, the United Nations has established
a voluntary framework that sets minimum security standards for different
types of radioactive material.61 The United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has opted to adhere to this standard, thus creating support for
the norm and potentially making it more likely that other nations will do the
same.62 As more nations abide by the norm, the United States itself is
increasingly protected from the risk of misused, stolen radioactive material.
When no spillover-minimizing arrangement exists, U.S. agencies can
play a role in the formation of one. Consider the SEC’s recent attempts to
regulate security-based swaps, which are complex financial transactions
that involve two parties agreeing to exchange payments contingent on
events such as changes in stock prices or interest rates.63 Such swaps, if not
properly regulated, can cause great harm to the global financial system.64
Yet, only a few nations have enacted regulations for the swaps. The lack of
regulation in other nations could produce problems for the United States if
poorly constructed swap deals made in those nations generate risks that spill
into U.S. markets. To reduce this risk, the SEC “is in discussions with its
foreign counterparts to explore steps toward harmonizing standards for such
regulation in the future.”65
C. International Epistemic Factors
Agencies also look to foreign regulations for epistemic benefits—that is,
for what the agencies can learn about the workability of different regulatory
standards. This section first illustrates how agencies look to foreign
regulations for guidance. It then examines how United States reliance on
foreign policies complements federal reliance on state-level policies. One
implication of this discussion is that arguments against the federal

60. See id.
61. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, International Safeguards, NRC.GOV (Nov. 3,
2014), http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/ip/intl-safeguards.html.
62. Physical Protection of Byproduct Material, 78 Fed. Reg. 16,922, 16,925 (Mar. 19,
2013).
63. Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968 (Mar. 19, 2013).
64. See, e.g., Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex
Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 444 (2013).
65. Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,056; see also Eric
C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United States
Government’s Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187, 191
(2010) (“Unless harmonization and centralization of international securities law occurs, this
race to the bottom will continue, and more financial crises will ensue.”).
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preemption of state law have less force when foreign policies are available
as models.
1. Foreign Regulation As Guidance for U.S. Regulation
If foreign regulations have worked well to solve a regulatory problem,
this success can spur U.S. agencies to consider whether similar approaches
are desirable here.66 For example, in 2009, the European Union adopted
regulations governing the transparency of retail roaming charges incurred
by European wireless customers. Its immediate success in Europe led the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) “to gather information on the
feasibility of instituting usage alerts and cut-off mechanisms similar to
those required under the European Union (EU) regulations.”67 Without the
European experience, the FCC probably would not have pursued this
regulatory effort.
Aside from looking to other nations for evidence of what they should be
doing, U.S. agencies also look to those nations to see what they need not
enact. The logic seems to be that the absence of a particular regulatory
feature in other comparably developed nations can serve as evidence that
such a feature is not a necessary part of a modern, legitimate regulatory
scheme that adequately protects the public from risks. For example, the
Department of Transportation justified its decision “not to require head
restraints in rear outboard designated seating positions” in part by pointing
out that European regulations were likewise lacking these head restraint
standards.68 The lack of regulations in a rich, comparatively consumerfriendly jurisdiction like Europe made it easier for the agency to argue that
it was not shirking its public duties by not having such regulations either.
2. Foreign Regulations As Replacements for State Regulations
The federalism literature has long recognized that policy variation among
states is valuable because the federal government can observe the various
policies, determine which ones work best, and adapt them at the federal
level.69 But states are often unlikely to experiment with different policies.70
In these instances, foreign regulations can fill the gap.
66. Looking to foreign decisions can be problematic if the U.S. agency free rides off of
the foreign agency’s efforts and simply mimics its decision without doing any individual
assessment of the options. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity,
and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 486 (2002). But if the
agencies avoid the temptation to engage in pure epistemic free riding, they can benefit by
looking to the foreign experience of selecting and implementing a standard as evidence of
that standard’s plausibility and practicability.
67. Measures Designed to Assist U.S. Wireless Consumers to Avoid “Bill Shock,” 75
Fed. Reg. 28,249 (May 20, 2010).
68. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 74,848 (Dec. 14, 2004).
69. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). For a discussion of this rationale in
legal scholarship, see Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and
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Consider that states often fail to regulate risks that have significant global
impacts because the harms from such risks reach far beyond one state’s
borders and thus each individual state has little incentive to absorb the cost
of regulating the risk on its own.71 When this problem occurs, federal
agencies can still look to foreign and international regulators for guidance.
For example, states have little incentive to invest resources in developing
robust methodologies for measuring how emissions impact climate change
because climate change is a global problem. As a result, when the EPA
searched for such a methodology, it did not look to the states but to the
United Nations.72
States are also sometimes unable to regulate because state action is
preempted by federal law.73 Federal preemption is most often justified by
the benefits of having a uniform national standard instead of a patchwork of
different states’ standards that can increase the costs of doing business
nationwide. When preemption occurs, though, the states have no law that
can serve as guidance for U.S. agencies. But U.S. agencies can still look
overseas. Consider the example of automobile regulation. In order to
ensure a national market for cars, many state-level automobile safety
standards are preempted by federal law.74 As a result, the Department of
Transportation cannot look to state policies for guidance when crafting
automobile safety standards, but the agency routinely looks to foreign
regulations and has recently implemented European safety standards.75
This last point has significant normative implications. Some have argued
against federal preemption because it deprives federal policymakers of the
ability to learn by observing policy variation at the state level.76 But this
Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1750–76 (2004); Roberta Romano, The
States As a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23
YALE J. ON REG. 209, 246 (2005).
70. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 615 (1980) (stating that federalism produces only “weak
effects” in promoting innovation); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 925 (1994) (“[I]ndividual states will
have no incentive to invest in experiments that involve any substantive or political risk.”).
71. Cf. Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 977
(2011) (“When a policy targets individual incentives and has no ‘externalities’—effects that
extend beyond an individual—then the treatment should be randomly assigned at the
individual level.”).
72. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
73. For a discussion of the arguments for and against regulatory preemption law and
policy, see generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability
Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449 (2008). For recent
Supreme Court decisions, see Brueswitz v. Wyeth, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555 (2009); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
74. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000).
75. See, e.g., Anthropomorphic Test Devices, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,304, 75,305 (Dec. 14,
2006).
76. See Listokin, supra note 22, at 551 (arguing that preemption “comes at a significant
cost—the elimination of information-producing policy variance that improves long-run
policy outcomes”); Nim Razook, A Contract-Enhancing Norm Limiting Federal Preemption
of Presumptively State Domains, 11 BYU J. PUB. L. 163 (1997) (arguing that state
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argument has less force when international policies can generate similar
information. In these instances, federal lawmakers and regulators can
capture the benefits of preemption—namely national uniformity—while
still being able to learn through policy variation. Of course, sometimes
foreign regulations will provide imperfect models because of cultural
differences among the nations.77 But while such differences can be
problematic, it should not be assumed that it is more difficult for agencies
to borrow from their foreign counterparts than their state-level counterparts.
Indeed, federal agencies may have an easier time adapting a foreign
regulation from a large nation facing a similar problem than scaling up a
state-level regulation that was originally designed to meet local needs.
In sum, foreign regulations often provide useful information about what
kinds of regulations may work to solve regulatory problems in the United
States. Foreign regulations are particularly valuable models for federal
agencies when state-level regulations are unavailable or inapplicable.
D. Foreign Affairs Factors
Regulatory agencies also consider the kinds of foreign affairs factors that
have traditionally been the bailiwick of diplomats and international lawyers.
This section discusses how regulatory agencies consider a host of foreign
affairs factors including: binding international law, international reputation
and relationships, the response of foreign nations to agency actions, and the
affect on international negotiations.
1. Binding International Law
Binding international law is perhaps the most straightforward of these
factors.78 Under various conventions and treaties, the United States is
obligated to take certain actions or suffer some punishment.79 The United
States’ treaty obligations may either be self-executing, that is to say they
may be immediately enforced,80 or non-self-executing, which would require

experimentation is usually preferable to federal preemption for traditionally state-governed
areas such as product liability law in part because of the value of experimentation).
77. One concern with looking to policies made in foreign nations instead of American
states is that “differences between nations are so great that one cannot infer the effects of a
variation in Country X will be similar to the effects of the same variation in Country Y.”
Listokin, supra note 22, at 549 n.184.
78. See Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 707–08
(2010) (explaining the difference between hard international law—that may entail binding
legal obligations—and soft international law—which does not produce litigation or direct
legal sanction but may still affect state behavior through its effect on norms and state
identities).
79. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S.
331; Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (providing that if a nation fails to enforce
its treaty obligations, “its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and
reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be
enforced by actual war”).
80. See Edye, 112 U.S. at 598–99.
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Congress to pass an implementing statute to enforce the treaty.81 The desire
to meet these obligations drives many regulatory actions. For example,
under the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, a U.N.
Convention, the United States must match certain emission standards for
aircrafts or else other nations can sanction the United States by banning its
airplanes from traveling though their airspace.82 In part to avoid this
sanction, the EPA updates its emissions standards to meet the international
standard.83
International law can also affect the procedures through which agencies
act. For example, the United States is party to World Trade Organization
(WTO) agreements that require nations to employ certain procedures when
setting trade standards.84 When the United States Trade Representative
enacts rules, it must ensure it follows these procedures.85
2. International Reputation and Relationships
Softer foreign affairs factors such as international reputation and
international relationships also enter into regulatory agencies’ decisionmaking calculus. Reputation is particularly important for agencies that are
part of informal intergovernmental networks of regulators that deal with
similar regulatory problems in their respective jurisdictions. These
networks lack the formal binding structure of a treaty. Instead, the
members are bound through relationships and trust.86 If an agency wants to
maintain its membership in an informal network and reap the cooperative
benefits from such membership, it must demonstrate its trustworthiness.87
For example, the Federal Reserve is a member of the Basel Committee, an
informal network of international regulators that recommends banking
standards.88 If the U.S. banking agency were to ignore the Committee’s

81. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829), overruled on other grounds
by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
82. See Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1221, 1224–25 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 2(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (2012).
85. Submission of Representations Concerning Standards-Related Activity, 47 Fed. Reg.
50,207 (Nov. 5, 1982) (enacting regulations that “provide for the proper submission of
representations by certain foreign countries concerning standards-related activities viewed
by such countries as barriers to trade” as required by WTO agreements).
86. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 117, 161–62 (2007) (“Foreign regulators and nongovernmental organizations also play
influential roles as evangelists and watchdogs of agency professionalism, diligence, and
fidelity.”).
87. As Anne-Marie Slaughter has observed, these kinds of networks give agencies “an
incentive ‘to maintain their reputation in the eyes of other members of the network.’” ANNEMARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 55 (2004) (quoting Giandomenico Majone, The
New European Agencies: Regulation by Information, 4 J. ENVTL. PUB. POL’Y 262, 272
(1997)).
88. See Charles K. Whitehead, What’s Your Sign? International Norms, Signals, and
Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 695, 710 (2006) (describing the Board as a “driving force”
on the Basel Committee).
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core recommendations, it would jeopardize its standing in the group.89 As a
result, the agency tends to enact the core recommendations domestically.90
3. Foreign Responses to Agency Actions
Another foreign policy consideration concerns whether and how foreign
nations will respond to an agency action. A regulation seen as cooperative
may be reciprocated with a cooperative regulation that has benefits for the
United States. The clearest example of this consideration comes from a
2006 Department of Transportation proposal to allow foreign investors in
U.S. airlines to engage in commercial decision making at the airlines if the
United States has an agreement with the foreign investor’s home country
that permits reciprocal investment opportunities in its national air carriers
for U.S. investors.91 In proposing the rule, the agency observed that
“European Union negotiators have made it clear that the European Union
will consider the outcome of this proceeding in determining whether it will”
allow U.S. investment in European airlines.92 In other words, if the
Department of Transportation made it easier for Europeans to invest in and
control U.S. airlines, the Europeans would likely do the same for
Americans.93
By contrast, a regulation that is seen as uncooperative could be met with
an antagonistic response by foreign regulators. For example, it has been
suggested that the Federal Reserve’s proposed rule to heighten capital
requirements for foreign banks could trigger a tit-for-tat response by foreign
regulators who would ratchet up their regulation of American banks
operating on their turf.94 As the New York Times hinted: “One looming
question is whether the Europeans will retaliate against the new rules once
they go into effect—and force American banks to lock up capital at their

89. This would entail significant costs, as some of the most important banking rules are
crafted by the Basel Committee. See Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly
Interventions During and After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (2011)
(“In the area of capital requirements, the most important rulemaking is occurring at the
international level, as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision moves to finalize the
Basel III Accords.”).
90. See Maximillian L. Feldman, Note, The Domestic Implementation of International
Regulations, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 401, 410 (2013) (observing that the Federal Reserve Board
was, for certain provisions of the Accord, “so strongly committed to an international
regulation that it disregards contrary public comments and implements the international
regulation domestically”).
91. Airworthiness Directives, 71 Fed. Reg. 26,425 (May 5, 2006).
92. Id. However, the agency insisted that it was not proposing the rule in order to secure
agreements with the European Union. Id.
93. Interestingly, state policymakers are not allowed to make similar calculations
concerning whether other states would reciprocate cooperative behavior. See Great A&P Tea
Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (invalidating a Mississippi law that required that milk
could be shipped into Mississippi from other states only if the other state would reciprocate
by accepting milk from Mississippi).
94. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Foreign
Banking Organizations and Foreign Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 76,628
(Dec. 28, 2012).
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operations overseas.”95 The agency is likely aware of this possibility and
has considered it as part of the decision-making process.
4. Effects on International Negotiations
The last type of foreign affairs factor concerns the signal that the agency
action sends to other nations about the United States’ negotiating position
on an international matter. Presidents and Congress have long been
understood to use their powers to signal U.S. foreign policy intentions to
other nations, a dynamic captured by what is known as costly signaling
theory.96 One insight from this Article is that these signals now are being
sent through agency actions. In this section, I briefly provide some
background on costly signaling theory in international relations and then
show how administrative actions have become vehicles for such signals.
The basic logic of signaling theory in international affairs is that when
one nation’s government takes an action at some expense, other nations
observe that action, find it credible because it was costly to take, and then
adjust their negotiating behavior accordingly. For example, Professor Jide
Nzelibe has shown that when Presidents decide not to authorize acts of
force unilaterally, but instead take the costly step of seeking congressional
authorization, “the President sends a more credible signal of the United
States’ resolve to prosecute the conflict.”97 Presumably, the adversary
nations respond by ratcheting up their war preparations or capitulating to
U.S. demands. Similarly, Professor Rachel Brewster has observed that, if
Congress were to enact significant climate change legislation, it would
serve as a costly signal to other nations about the United States’ willingness
to engage in treaty talks on climate change and contribute significantly to
Other nations may respond by
combating the global problem.98
reciprocating U.S. efforts to fight climate change. As Brewster explains,
“[t]his unselfishness on the part of the United States raises the possibility
that other states will act similarly.”99
Just as the President and Congress can send costly signals of negotiating
positions, so too can agencies. Indeed, under both Presidents George W.
Bush and Barack Obama, the EPA has used its decisions to send different
signals about the terms on which the United States is willing to engage in
negotiations on climate change.
The signal under Bush became part of the Supreme Court case
Massachusetts v. EPA.100 In that case, multiple groups petitioned the EPA

95. Peter Eavis, Exporting U.S. Rules for Foreign Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2014, at
B1.
96. See supra note 19.
97. Jide Nzelibe, A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution, 91 IOWA L. REV.
993, 1022 (2006).
98. See Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and
National Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245 (2010).
99. Id. at 259.
100. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles.101 The EPA
rejected the petition in part because of foreign policy concerns. In
particular, the EPA was concerned that “unilateral EPA regulation of
motor-vehicle greenhouse gas emissions might also hamper the President’s
ability to persuade key developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.”102 The EPA’s logic was that other nations will only cut their
emissions as a part of a quid pro quo deal with the United States. If the
United States unilaterally cuts greenhouse gas emissions, other nations will
free ride off of the United States’ efforts.
The signal contained in the EPA’s decision not to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions was that the United States was not willing to take any climate
change action or agree to any treaty that did not also wring emissions
concessions from developing nations. In game theory terms, the United
States did not want to invest in a public good while other players were free
riders.
The EPA under the Obama Administration has recently sent a very
different, more encouraging signal. The signal first came through the
EPA’s proposed rule capping greenhouse gas emissions from new coal
plants.103 Current market conditions make the construction of new coal
plants unattractive.104 The proposed rule would make such construction
even less likely because the plants would have to develop and employ
expensive technology to limit emissions.105
The proposed rule also offers foreign policy benefits. As the EPA
explained, the proposed rule “demonstrate[s] global leadership” in advance
of international talks on climate change.106 By taking the costly step of
challenging the coal industry, the Obama Administration was signaling its
willingness to contribute to the global fight on climate change. As
mentioned earlier, this American willingness—the world’s number two
carbon polluter—helped to bring about a cooperative agreement between
the United States and China, the world’s number one carbon polluter.107
Other nations may respond to this signal by reciprocating and increasing
their efforts or willingness to sign and implement an international treaty or
multilateral agreement on the matter.
This signaling rationale is not entirely inconsistent with the logic that the
EPA used under the George W. Bush presidency. Bush’s EPA was
concerned that U.S. action would lead to free riding, and Obama’s EPA is
assuming that U.S. action can spur reciprocal action from other nations.
Both free riding and reciprocity can occur at the same time because
101. Id. at 505.
102. Id. at 513–14.
103. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Statutory
Sources, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (Jan. 8, 2014).
104. See EPA, supra note 1.
105. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Statutory
Sources, 79 Fed. Reg. at 1430 (explaining that the proposed rule would force new coal plants
to implement carbon capture technologies).
106. See EPA, supra note 1.
107. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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different nations will respond differently to U.S. signals depending on their
own circumstances and decision making. The question is whether the good
achieved through the sum of other nations’ reciprocal efforts to fight
climate change outweighs the costs created when other nations decide to
free ride off of U.S. efforts. I will leave answering this question to the
foreign policy experts. My primary point is that the EPA, under two
different administrations, has used the same issue—the regulation of
climate change—to send different costly signals to foreign nations about the
United States’ willingness to contribute to the global fight against climate
change.
In sum, agencies routinely consider foreign affairs factors before they act.
They take into account hard obligations under international law, how a
particular action might affect the agency’s reputation and relationships
overseas, how foreign nations might respond to the content of a regulation,
and what international negotiating position is signaled by the agency action.
II. AGENCY DECISION MAKING
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION DILEMMA
The paradigmatic case of an agency considering international factors
involves an agency deciding whether to adopt a standard that is coordinated
with other nations or whether to maintain its own domestically crafted
regulation. I will refer to this as the international coordination dilemma.
This part examines the dilemma from two different angles. Part II.A
models agency decision making with regard to the dilemma using a stylized
ideal point model from political science and applies this model to real world
facts.108 This model shows how agencies must consider not only whether
to coordinate, but also whether such coordination can take place on terms
more favorable to the United States. Part II.B views the dilemma from an
institutional design perspective. It examines whether domestic institutions
can be designed to make it more likely that agencies will engage in
beneficial coordination with foreign regulators and whether these
institutions can push the outcomes of such coordination closer to American
preferences. Drawing from the international affairs literature on domestic
constraints, this section shows that there is a trade-off between these two
goals. Institutional designs that make coordination more likely will also
tend to reduce the United States’ bargaining power to dictate the terms of
such coordination. This section concludes by discussing how this finding
has implications for judicial review and presidential oversight of agencies.
A. An Ideal Point Model of Agency Decision Making
and the International Coordination Dilemma
This section introduces a stylized ideal point model of how agencies face
the international coordination dilemma and applies the model to a couple of
108. See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes:
Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CAL. L. REV. 813, 820 (2010) (explaining
how ideal point models are often used to explain roll call votes in Congress).
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real world cases. The model assumes that agencies make a good faith effort
to identify and consider the full range of significant factors that determine
whether a regulatory action improves public welfare in the United States.109
The model ignores oversight from Congress and White House offices, and
it assumes that only one agency is making the decision without input or
influence from other agencies.110 I make these simplifying assumptions in
order to isolate as best as possible the influence international coordination
benefits have over agency decision making, irrespective of other influences
such as industry capture, political oversight, and competition among federal
agencies. The following section on institutional design will take a closer
look at how some of these influences impact agency decisions involving
international coordination.
1. The Model
Imagine a line that represents the range of policy outcomes an agency
could choose for a particular regulatory problem.111 One point on the line
is the “domestic ideal point,” which represents the policy outcome that
would maximize utility if the agency were to focus exclusively on
considerations internal to the United States and ignore the content of
foreign and international policies on the same matter.112 Some utility is lost
if U.S. regulators enact policies that depart from this ideal point, and the
size of the utility loss increases as regulators move farther away from the
ideal point.113 For shorthand, I will refer to these losses and gains as
“domestic utility.”
Another point on the line represents the policy outcome that aligns with
an international norm or standard. I will refer to this point as the
“international point.” The international point is unlikely to be the same as
the domestic ideal point because it was either formed by a foreign nation
109. This assumes that agencies are relatively free to enact the optimal policy without
constraints from domestic interest groups. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational
Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 115 (2009) (noting that, in
the real world, agencies “are not free to pursue optimal global public policy for its own sake”
and “one should expect that their positions will be shaped by the preferences of domestic
constituencies”).
110. See generally Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The
Executive Branch Is a “They,” Not an “It,” 96 MINN. L. REV. 194, 200 (2011) (showing how
U.S. international policy can be affected by competition among agencies with divergent
interests).
111. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107
MICH. L. REV. 53, 65 (2008) (modeling the preferences of the median voter as an ideal point
on a policy space).
112. One can also imagine this point as the policy that the United States should enact if it
were the only nation that existed. See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Sovereignty and
Delegation in International Organizations, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 84 (2008)
(referring to the “stand-alone” ideal point as the policy that a nation would enact if it were
the only country that existed).
113. In economic terms, utility is negatively correlated with the distance between the
domestic ideal point and the actual enacted policy. See Stephenson, supra note 111, at 65
(“The voter’s utility is a decreasing function of the distance between the policy outcome and
the voters ideal point.”).
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that has different preferences than the United States or it reflects a
compromise among various nations. Thus, when a U.S. agency adopts a
policy that aligns with the international point, it is setting a policy that
creates costs from the loss of domestic utility.
To flesh out the model further, assume that an agency is tasked with
formulating a policy for a particular regulatory problem X. The domestic
ideal point is policy outcome X1.0. However, a group of foreign nations
have already addressed the same problem and compromised by agreeing to
policy outcome X2.0. The United States cannot negotiate with the nations
and cannot convince them to change their standard to X1.0. The agency has
only two discrete policy choices: X1.0 or X2.0. A choice of X2.0 would
produce coordination benefits, perhaps by creating network effects that
improve gains from trade, but would at the same time incur costs, perhaps
through the internal costs to U.S. regulators and the regulated parties.
Conversely, a choice of X1.0 would create the benefits of adhering to the
United States’ ideal range and the concomitant domestic utility of that
choice, whereas the costs of that same decision could include harm to the
U.S. foreign relations position or a reduction in trade with those foreign
nations. The question for the agency is simply whether the benefits of the
international point outweigh the costs of departing from a domestic ideal. If
X2.0 is too far away from the domestic ideal, the United States would be
better off sticking to its own ideal standard and not joining the international
arrangement.114
If we relax the assumption that X2.0 is fixed and allow for the possibility
that it could be renegotiated or otherwise altered, the decision making
becomes slightly more complicated. Imagine once again that X1.0 represents
the domestic ideal point and X2.0 the foreign standard, but now there is a
range of policy options in between, represented by the points X1.1,
X1.2 . . . X1.9. The U.S. agency can stick to its domestic ideal point, adopt
the foreign standard, or try to arrange a compromise at any of these points.
Now, the agency must determine whether it can convince the foreign
nations to adopt a coordinated standard closer to X1.0 and, if so, at what
cost. Even if the benefits of international consistency outweigh the costs of
diverging from the domestic ideal point, the agency has to consider whether
the United States can extract a deal that captures the benefits of
international coordination but on terms more favorable to the United States.
2. Applying the Model to Facts
This section applies the ideal point model to two regulatory cases. The
first, taken from the Second Circuit case Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture,115 concerns the Department of

114. In buyer-seller deals, this analysis is similar to the seller’s “walk-away point,” the
point at which he will abandon the sale because the offered price is too far below the asking
price. See Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789,
1791–92 (2000).
115. 613 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Agriculture’s regulation of packing materials. The second case involves the
Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic and Safety
Administration (NHTSA) and its regulation of automobile side impact
safety.116
a. The Packing Materials Regulation
The Department of Agriculture regulates packing materials used in
international trade.117 A few years ago, the agency had to decide whether
to enact a stricter standard backed by U.S. environmentalists or to adhere to
an international standard that was formed pursuant to a multinational
convention signed by the United States.118 The international standard was
voluntary but multi-nation adherence to the standard would generate trade
benefits by standardizing trade requirements for packing materials.119
However, the international standard was far from ideal for domestic
purposes because it allowed shippers to use wood packing material
susceptible to wood-boring insects, which can bury themselves into the
wood in foreign countries and then emerge in the United States, where the
invasive insects pose a threat to the ecosystem.120 The environmentalists
urged the department to require substitute packing materials that do not
contain these wood-boring pests. The department conceded that this
approach “was likely the most effective means of eliminating pest risk
associated with the importation of goods.”121
In terms of the model, assume that the environmentalists’
recommendation represented the domestic ideal point because it minimized
domestic risk at low domestic costs, and assume that the international
standard departed significantly from this ideal. The first question for the
Department of Agriculture was whether the benefits from international
consistency outweighed the losses to domestic utility from the increased
risk of invasive insects. The agency seemed to believe that it did because it
favored the “the harmonization and facilitation of global trade” over
“competing considerations of pest control and environmental concerns.”122
But a second, more complicated question was whether international
coordination was possible on terms more favorable to the United States.
The environmental group argued that it was, observing that the
“international market for substitute packing materials might expand over
time if a phased-in substitute-materials-only requirement were promulgated
116. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Side Impact Protection; Grant in Part,
Denial in Part of Petition for Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,508 (May 24, 2000) (rejecting the
European standard); cf. Anthropomorphic Test Devices, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,304 (Dec. 14, 2006)
(adopting the ES-2re test dummy standard, a modification of the European standard that it
had rejected earlier).
117. See Importation of Unmanufactured Wood Articles; Solid Wood Packing Material,
64 Fed. Reg. 3049 (Jan. 20, 2009).
118. Natural Res. Def. Council, 613 F.3d at 79–85.
119. Id. at 80 n.2.
120. Id. at 79.
121. Id. at 81.
122. Id. at 86.
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by the United States.”123 In other words, if the United States adopted its
ideal standard, it would lower the cost for other nations to do the same, thus
making the standard more attractive to foreign nations.
But, on the other hand, there were a couple of significant barriers to
convincing foreign nations to reconsider the international standard. First,
there was a massive collective action problem. A convention consisting of
173 nations established the recommended international standard.124 While
the United States is a powerful nation and pressure from the United States
can go a long way, it would be quite an ordeal to reopen the drafting
process for the international standard and produce something acceptable to
so many nations. Moreover, there were procedural costs. The standard was
promulgated pursuant to a formal convention, under which any standard
would have to be set or amended in accordance with a 151-page procedural
manual, thus increasing the cost of revisiting the issue.125
After taking these factors into consideration, the agency decided that the
gains from international coordination were great and that such coordination
was unlikely to occur on terms more favorable to the United States because,
in the agency’s words, “the [international] negotiations would be timeconsuming, and their outcome would depend upon a variety of factors,
including developing nations’ technical capacities and anticipated economic
growth.”126
b. The Automobile Side Collision Regulation
The calculus looked quite different for the Department of Transportation
when it considered a petition, filed by an international trade association
representing carmakers’ interests, that asked the agency to replace its
automobile side impact standard with the European standard.127 If the
agency made this change, then United States and European carmakers
would be able to sell their cars in each other’s markets without changing
specifications to meet each jurisdiction’s requirements.
Assume that the United States’ status quo represented the United States
ideal, a realistic assumption given that the agency determined that the U.S.
standard was better than the European standard because it was safer.128 The
question for the agency was whether the benefits of coordination
outweighed the costs of departing from this ideal. The agency ultimately
concluded that they did not and decided to stick with the U.S. standard.129
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See generally FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., INTERNATIONAL PLANT
PROTECTION CONVENTION, 2012 PROCEDURE MANUAL: STANDARD SETTING (Nov. 16, 2012),
available at https://www.ippc.int/sites/default/files/documents//1356016213_IPPCProcedure
Manual_Part3_StSet_.pdf.
126. Natural Res. Def. Council, 613 F.3d at 85–86.
127. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Side Impact Protection; Grant in Part,
Denial in Part of Petition for Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,508, 33,508 (May 24, 2000).
128. Natural Res. Def. Council, 613 F.3d at 81–85.
129. Id.
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Again, though, the agency considered whether coordination was possible
but on terms closer to the United States’ ideal of a safer standard. The
agency, after rejecting the proposal to adopt the European standard,
observed that “our first steps will be to work with the Europeans to cure
The agency’s decision to achieve
[their standard’s] problems.”130
coordination on better terms proved fruitful. Six years later, the Europeans
had improved their standard, and NHTSA announced that it planned to
adopt the European standard “in an upgraded Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard on side impact protection.”131
What explains NHTSA’s willingness to hold out until European
regulators moved closer to the United States’ preferred safety standard
while the Department of Agriculture would not try to convince other
nations to budge on the packing material regulation? At least one major
factor was the cost of negotiating due to the number of parties involved.
NHTSA could work closely with its European counterparts to address its
concerns with the European standard, and the two sets of regulators could
negotiate among themselves. By contrast, the Department of Agriculture
would have had to win approval from officials representing many more
countries with different and disparate regulatory preferences. Also, because
NHTSA and its European counterparts were negotiating informally, they
were not hampered by the same formality that would have met the
Department of Agriculture had it tried to update the international standard
pursuant to the lengthy international convention.
B. Domestic Institutions and International Interagency Coordination
The model developed in Part II.A shows that agencies (1) often want to
coordinate with international and foreign regulators because coordination
brings benefits, and (2) would prefer that coordination occur on terms as
close to the United States’ ideal policy as feasible. Given these two goals,
the institutional design question becomes whether domestic institutions can
be set up to either increase the likelihood of beneficial international
coordination or to make it more likely that such coordination favors the
United States.
This section shows that there is a trade-off between these two goals.132 I
first explain this trade-off in more detail. I then discuss implications of this
trade-off for judicial review of agency decisions involving the negotiation

130. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Side Impact Protection; Grant in Part,
Denial in Part of Petition for Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. at 33,512.
131. Anthropomorphic Test Devices, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,304, 75,305 (Dec. 14, 2006)
(adopting the ES-2re test dummy standard, a modification of the European standard that it
had rejected earlier).
132. As Robert Schmidt has explained: “[D]omestic political constraints may help a
divided party claim greater value in the external bargain[, but i]f the constraints are
severe . . . they may reduce the efficiency of the external bargain, perhaps reducing it to the
no agreement outcome.” Robert J. Schmidt, International Negotiations Paralyzed by
Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon
Commission, 26 ENVTL. L. 95, 117 (1996).
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and implementation of international coordination agreements. I also
discuss implications for presidential oversight of these agency decisions.
1. The Cooperation-Bargaining Advantage Trade-Off
When agencies bargain with their foreign counterparts over the terms of a
regulatory standard, they face constraints at home that limit the range of
policies that they can successfully implement domestically. These
constraints come from actors, such as the President, Congress, the courts,
and powerful interest groups, who have the power to block agency
implementation of a standard.133 As a matter of institutional design, the
strength of these domestic constraints can be adjusted. For example, courts
can be stripped of jurisdiction over a set of agency decisions, thus removing
this constraint on the agency. Adjusting the level of domestic constraints
on agencies has effects on both the likelihood of coordination and the
substantive bargaining outcomes.
Consider first the effect on the likelihood of coordination. Reducing the
strength of domestic constraints on agencies makes it more likely that an
agency will be able to coordinate with its foreign counterparts, while
increasing the strength of the constraints makes coordination less likely.
When domestic constraints are weak or nonexistent, there is a greater range
of standards that an agency can successfully implement at home. To
borrow the terminology used in the literature on international affairs, there
is a larger “win set.”134 This larger win set make coordination more likely
to occur because there are simply more policy options that can feasibly
satisfy the negotiating parties and their respective domestic constraints. For
example, imagine that the Department of Transportation is trying to
coordinate an automobile safety standard with European regulators, and
there are ten possible safety standards on the table. If the President has said
that five of the options are unacceptable to him, then half of the options are
no longer viable and an agreement is less likely. But, if the President has
said that he will support any coordinated agreement that the Department of
Transportation reaches, then presumably all ten options are still on the
table—at least for the United States—and this large win set makes a
coordinated agreement more likely.
Now consider the second, and less intuitive, effect involving bargaining
power. The greater the domestic constraint, the more bargaining power the
agency has over its foreign counterparts.135 The reason is that, when
several policy options are on the table, the U.S. agency’s bargaining
133. See Verdier, supra note 109, at 126 (observing that agencies negotiating with their
foreign counterparts “are instead politically and legally accountable to numerous domestic
constituencies, including not only their superiors in the executive branch but also the
legislature, the courts, the media, and the public”).
134. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 437 (1988).
135. See id.; see also Brewster, supra note 98, at 253 (noting that “a government’s
bargaining position is strengthened when it can credibly commit to accepting only its
preferred treaty draft (or one that is very close)”).
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position is strengthened if it can credibly threaten that only its preferred
option, or some option close to it, would satisfy U.S. domestic constraints.
Thus, if the U.S. agency and its foreign counterparts want to achieve a
coordinated outcome, coordination can only take place with a policy more
favorable to the United States.
To illustrate this effect, consider again the example of the Department of
Transportation negotiating over a coordinated standard with European
regulators. The negotiations start with ten possible options on the table.
But the Department of Transportation says that the President will only
support the United States’ three preferred options and thus coordination can
only occur with one of these three standards. With so few options on the
table, coordination is less likely. However, if Europe stands to benefit
sufficiently from coordination with the United States and it believes the
domestic constraint is real, it will likely capitulate and agree to an option
that is more favorable to the United States.
Taken together, these findings show that there is a cooperationbargaining advantage trade-off when designing domestic institutions that
oversee agency decisions involving international coordination. High
domestic constraints produce less cooperation but give the United States a
greater bargaining advantage. Weak domestic constraints lead to greater
international coordination but sacrifice American bargaining leverage.136
2. Judicial Review As a Domestic Constraint
on International Interagency Coordination
This trade-off has significant implications for how we consider the role
of courts in reviewing agency decisions on international coordination.
Consider that courts have several times declined to exercise jurisdiction
over agencies’ negotiation and implementation of international coordination
agreements because of concerns that judicial oversight would constrain the
executive.137 As Richard Stewart has observed, some courts worry that
they will “impair the ability of the executive to conclude and promptly and
efficiently implement international agreements.”138 What these courts may
have overlooked, though, is that, by refusing to exercise jurisdiction, they
were removing a domestic constraint that could benefit the executive by
giving the executive a bargaining chip.
To illustrate this trade-off with more concrete detail, consider the D.C.
Circuit case Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative.139 The
United States Trade Representative (USTR) was negotiating the North
136. These findings are an extension of a leading international affairs article by Robert
Putnam, who showed that a domestic constraint, such as the need for legislative approval on
the executive, could be a bargaining advantage for the executive. See Putnam, supra note
134, at 434. Putnam showed that a nation’s bargaining advantage is increased if it can
credibly show to other parties that it faces a domestic constraint that limits the range of
options it can accept and implement at home. Id.
137. See Stewart, supra note 16, at 726.
138. Id.
139. 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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America Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico.140 U.S.
environmental groups were worried that the agreements would override
existing domestic environmental protections, and they sued to compel the
USTR to assess the agreement’s adverse environmental effects.141 The
court held that it had no jurisdiction because the USTR had not yet taken a
final agency action.142 Such finality would not occur until the USTR
submitted the agreements for presidential and congressional approval, a
decision that the court also lacked power to review.143 The result was that
the court would not have jurisdiction at any point in the negotiations.
The court may have been reluctant to assert jurisdiction because it would
affect the executive’s ability to conduct foreign affairs.144 However, by
refusing to exercise jurisdiction, the court made it harder for the USTR to
credibly threaten that it could not agree to any deal that did not have strong
environmental protections because otherwise the deal could be bogged
down in U.S. courts over claims that it did not meet statutory obligations
relating to the environment. Ultimately, the lack of jurisdiction made it
more likely that a deal would be implemented but less likely that the terms
would reflect U.S. environmental values.
A similar effect can be seen in the case Jensen v. National Marine
Fisheries Service.145 That case involved the U.S.-Canadian coordination of
Pacific Ocean fishing rules. The nations set up a regulatory scheme in
which an international agency—the International Pacific Halibut
Commission—recommended fishing rules subject to approval by the
American and Canadian heads of state.146 These rules were then
implemented domestically.147 The Jensen case concerned a rule that
fishing vessels must throw back halibut that was incidentally caught in nets
set to catch other fish.148 U.S. owners of fishing vessels challenged the
enforcement of the rule by the domestic acting agency, the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), and argued instead for a rule that allowed them

140. Id. at 917–19.
141. The groups were worried about “the agreements’ possible preemptive effect on
various federal and state environmental regulations,” and they wanted the USTR to prepare
an environmental impact statement under NEPA. Id. at 918–19.
142. Id. at 923 (“As plaintiffs have failed to identify any final agency action upon which
our jurisdiction under the APA could be grounded, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
their claims.”).
143. Id. at 919.
144. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 727 (“Deference to executive flexibility is also
reflected in Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative.”).
145. 512 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1975).
146. Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean
and Bering Sea, U.S.-Can., March 2, 1953, 5 U.S.T. 5, 8–9.
147. This kind of scheme is quite common. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Great
Lakes and International Environmental Law: Time for Something Completely Different?, 54
WAYNE L. REV. 1571, 1586–89 (2008).
148. Jensen, 512 F.2d at 1190 (“They complain of a regulation enacted by the
Commission which prohibits them from keeping halibut which they catch in their nets
incidentally to other fish upon which they concentrate their efforts.”).
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to keep some percentage of halibut caught in certain areas.149 The court,
instead of viewing the matter as a NMFS action subject to judicial review,
categorized the matter as a presidential action that was not subject to review
because “presidential action in the field of foreign affairs is committed to
presidential discretion by law.”150
By declining to exercise jurisdiction, the court freed the executive to
implement an internationally coordinated standard without worrying about
judicial vetoes. But the court also hampered the executive’s ability to
negotiate future rules more favorable to U.S. interests because the holding
made it impossible for the U.S. executive to credibly argue to the
international agency and the Canadians that a particular standard was
unacceptable because it would likely be blocked in U.S. court.
If a general pattern emerges of courts declining to exercise jurisdiction in
these kinds of cases, it could result in a more widespread decrease in U.S.
bargaining power. In particular, foreign officials would learn that the U.S.
judiciary is not a constraint on agencies implementing international
agreements and would adjust their negotiating posture by refusing to view
the U.S. judiciary as a relevant actor that can take certain policy options off
the negotiating table.
My point here is descriptive and not normative.151 I am not urging courts
to exercise jurisdiction and reject the domestic implementation of
international agreements more often. But the findings of the coordinationbargaining advantage trade-off can have normative implications. One
potential extrapolation of these findings is that judicial deference regimes
should be sensitive to the executive’s goals in particular cases.152 In any
given case, it could be that bargaining advantage is more important to the
executive than increasing the likelihood of coordination. In these cases, if
the judiciary truly wants to aid the executive, it would do better to exercise
jurisdiction and potentially halt the implementation of an international
agreement on coordinated regulatory standards. If a court were to block
implementation, the nations’ agencies could return to the negotiating table
and credibly claim that certain options were off the table because of
domestic opposition from the judiciary. This claim could give the United
States a significant bargaining advantage.

149. Id. Presumably they wanted to keep halibut caught in areas where halibut
overfishing was less of a problem.
150. Id. at 1191.
151. My descriptive finding is consistent with Professor Daniel Abebe’s recent article
showing that, for foreign affairs cases, “determining the appropriate level of deference to the
[executive] requires consideration of both internal, domestic constraints and external,
international constraints.” Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs
Law, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 53 (2013).
152. Cf. id. at 52 (“[D]eference regimes should also be responsive to structural changes in
international politics.”).
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3. Presidential Oversight As a Domestic Constraint
on International Interagency Coordination
A similar trade-off can be seen in how Presidents choose to oversee
agency decisions about whether to coordinate their standards with foreign
regulations.
Consider the potential effects of President Obama’s 2012 executive order
Among other
promoting international regulatory cooperation.153
provisions, the order tasks agencies with considering “regulatory
approaches by a foreign government” with the purpose of eliminating
“differences between the regulatory approaches of U.S. agencies and those
of their foreign counterparts [that] might not be necessary and might impair
the ability of American businesses to export and compete
internationally.”154 This order increases the likelihood that U.S. agencies
will adopt standards coordinated with foreign regulations.155 At the same
time, though, the order lessens domestic constraints on agencies seeking to
coordinate regulations and thus may make it more likely that any such
coordination occurs with regulatory details that come from foreign and not
U.S. agencies.
The lessening of domestic constraints comes from the publicly
observable fact that the President is unlikely to veto a domestic agency’s
adoption of a foreign regulatory standard that is of roughly similar
stringency as the existing U.S. standard. This presidential position could
make it more likely that any differences between the two standards are
reconciled in favor of the foreign nation. To illustrate, imagine that a U.S.
agency and a foreign government agency have each adopted different
regulatory standards for the same regulatory problem. Both agencies agree
that coordination is preferable. The U.S. agency asks the foreign agency to
switch to the U.S. standard. However, the foreign agency demurs, arguing
that its head of state does not want the agency to copy U.S. regulatory
standards for a variety of political reasons. The foreign agency then asks
whether, in the interest of international coordination, the U.S. agency would
adopt its standard. The U.S. agency cannot turn around and argue that the
President is averse to having U.S. agencies adopt foreign-made standards
because the President has publicly declared the exact opposite position. As
a result, under this highly stylized example, the gap between United States
and foreign regulations is more likely to be bridged with the U.S. agency
agreeing to move closer to the foreign agency’s position instead of vice
versa.

153. Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413, 26,413 (May 1, 2012).
154. Id. at 26,413–14.
155. See, e.g., Harmonization of Airworthiness Standards—Fire Extinguishers and Class
B and F Cargo Compartments, 79 Fed. Reg. 38,266 (July 7, 2014) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 25) (stating that the proposed rulemaking “would eliminate differences between
U.S. aviation standards and those of other civil aviation authorities by creating a single set of
certification requirements for transport category airplanes that would be acceptable in both
the United States and Europe”).
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President Obama’s executive order may have the effect of exacerbating
an existing trend that favors European over U.S. standards. Professor
Gregory Shaffer has observed that, when coordinating with European
regulations, “the United States has made most of the changes” and adopted
Shaffer
“international standards that mirror [European] ones.”156
hypothesizes that this trend is due in part to the size of the European
market, which is larger than the U.S. market and thus gives Europe a
bargaining advantage because U.S. businesses are eager for access to this
market.157 If this finding is right, then President Obama’s executive order
may reinforce U.S. tendencies to adopt European standards.
I do not mean to suggest that President Obama’s executive order is illconceived. On net, it is likely that the order produces benefits from newly
coordinated standards that outweigh the costs from the possibility that the
details of these standards come more from foreign regulators than from U.S.
regulators. Nevertheless, the basic descriptive point remains that President
Obama has enacted an order that could reduce the U.S. agencies’ bargaining
advantages in order to increase gains from international cooperation. If we
are to properly calibrate domestic institutions that affect international
interagency coordination, we must take into account these kinds of impacts.
III. LEGAL DOCTRINE AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF AGENCY ACTIONS
Doctrinally, the most pressing question involving the internationalization
of agency actions is whether agencies can rely on international factors to
support their actions under judicial review and, if so, which ones. This part
suggests that the current law establishes a presumption that agencies can
rely on international factors, even when Congress has not expressly
authorized such considerations.
This part proceeds as follows. It begins by providing background on
hard look review, the process through which courts review agency actions
to determine in part whether the agency has relied on permissible factors to
support its actions. It then shows how, over the past thirty years, the D.C.
Circuit has developed a body of case law creating a presumption that
agencies can consider international considerations, even when the enabling
statutes are silent on the matter. The final section discusses Massachusetts
v. EPA, which held that the EPA’s consideration of an international factor
was invalid, and asks whether that holding should change our understanding
of the presumption developed by the D.C. Circuit.158 Applying the
taxonomy developed in Part I of this Article, I suggest a narrow reading of
Massachusetts v. EPA that would keep intact the D.C. Circuit’s
presumption in favor of international factors.

156. See Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and
Limits of New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and
Safe Harbor Agreements, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 73–74 (2002).
157. Id.
158. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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A. Hard Look Review: Permissible and Impermissible Factors
Hard look review is the process through which courts ensure that agency
decisions are based on a “consideration of the relevant factors.”159 If
Congress has expressly authorized the consideration of a factor, then
agencies clearly can rely on that factor. The problem occurs when the
agency’s enabling statue is silent or ambiguous as to a factor. In these
instances, courts have adopted two sometimes competing presumptions,
which I will refer to as the logical relevance and impermissible politics
presumptions.
The logical relevance presumption simply holds that, when Congress is
silent as to a factor, courts will presume that an agency can consider that
factor if it is “logically relevant” to its decision.160 Furthermore, if a factor
is logically relevant, agencies can rely on that factor absent a clear
congressional intent to the contrary.161 These presumptions have been
affirmed in a line of cases in the D.C. Circuit, the most important circuit for
administrative law purposes because of the volume of administrative law
cases it hears and its reputation for handling those cases well.162
Meanwhile, the impermissible politics presumption holds that agencies
cannot rely on crude political factors to justify their decisions. This
approach is rooted in a strand of case law suggesting that judicial review of
agency action is “a means of cabining political discretion.”163 The most
relevant case in this line of jurisprudence is the Supreme Court’s 1983
decision Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co.,164 which is now seen as establishing that agencies must

159. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); see also
Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1307–09 (2007) (explaining how hard look review relates to other
administrative law doctrines such as Chevron and Skidmore); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law As Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 490–505
(2010); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to
Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 490–99
(1997) (describing how hard look review creates uncertainty about how courts will treat
agency decisions and how this uncertainty can discourage agencies from adopting rules);
Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 753 (2006) (showing how agencies can increase their chances of surviving
hard look review by investing more resources in compiling a record for judicial review);
David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 2317 (2010) (arguing that there is no
difference between hard look review and any other standard of review because courts
invariably look to the basic “reasonableness” of the agency decision).
160. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a
Decision?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 73.
161. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
162. See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT 23–46
(1999); see also Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The
Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123
YALE L.J. 266, 389 (2013) (“In about 1970, the D.C. Circuit rapidly transformed into a de
facto specialized court for agency litigation.”).
163. CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF BUREAUCRACY 193 (1990).
164. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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“explain their decisions in technocratic, statutory, or scientifically driven
terms, not political terms.”165
Taken together, these two approaches suggest that, under hard look
review, agencies generally can base their actions on any logically relevant
factor except political factors.
Applied to international considerations, the doctrinal question becomes:
Which international considerations are logically relevant factors that
agencies can use and which are impermissible political factors? Below I
scour the case law to help answer this question.
B. D.C. Circuit Precedent on International Considerations
Over the past few decades, the D.C. Circuit has decided a string of cases
in which it held or suggested that an agency could rely on a variety of
international factors, even in the absence of express authorization by
Congress. These cases establish a presumption in favor of allowing
agencies to rely on international factors. This section briefly discusses each
of these D.C. Circuit cases to show how, collectively, they create this
presumption.
1. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission166 is the first D.C. Circuit opinion I could find on the matter of
international considerations by agencies. The 1981 case involved a
challenge to a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) decision to allow the
export of nuclear materials to the Philippines.167 In its decision-making
process, the agency relied on international factors to help decide several
questions, among them, the agency’s consideration of foreign impact on
American interests and the impact on the global commons, and the court
upheld the agency’s consideration of each factor.168
First, the agency had to determine whether it had authority to assess risks
to the “global commons” under NEPA, which requires agencies to issue
environmental impact statements regarding all significant actions affecting
the environment but is vague about whether and how agencies should
consider international or global risks.169 The agency decided that it had
such authority in part out of respect for the spirit of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which the United States had signed.170
Although the treaty does not expressly require nations to consider global
165. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2009).
166. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
167. Id. at 1348.
168. Id. at 1365–66.
169. Id. at 1353 (“The Commission interpreted NEPA to require consideration of
environmental impacts on the United States, and to permit consideration of impacts on the
global commons.”).
170. Id. at 1360 n.68.
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environmental impacts, the agreement was designed to minimize
environmental dangers from the spread and use of nuclear material.171 The
NRC’s decision to assess how the exportation of nuclear material to the
Philippines would affect the global commons was consistent with this
purpose of the treaty. By acting in concert with this international goal, the
NRC helped the United States maintain its standing as a nation properly
concerned with the effects of nuclear proliferation.
Second, the agency had to consider whether the export of the nuclear
material would in fact harm the global commons.172 It concluded that the
risk to the global commons was insignificant because “American abstention
from international nuclear trade risks leaving the field to less responsible
suppliers and encouraging uncontrolled proliferation.”173 By approving the
deal and working with the Philippines, the United States could better
“prevent deterioration of the worldwide environment” than other nations.174
Third, the agency had to consider whether to assess the environmental
impacts specific to the Philippines and its population.175 Here, the agency
concluded that it did not have the requisite legal authority under NEPA.
The agency’s primary rationale was that such site-specific evaluations
would require the agency to demand that the Philippines give it access to
local sites, which would push against “principles of national sovereignty”
and impact U.S.-Filipino relations.176
In terms of the taxonomy developed in this Article, the agency relied on
factors involving international law and international reputation, the
minimization of global spillover effects, and the United States’ relationship
with a foreign nation. The D.C. Circuit upheld the agency’s use of each
factor in its broader ruling affirming the issuance of the license. More
specifically, characterizing the case as one “of agency jurisdiction and legal
obligation,”177 the D.C. Circuit held that an environmental impact statement
was not required for the issuance of a license to the Philippines when the
extraterritorial effect of the agency action is limited to the recipient country,
here the Philippines. Highlighting international cooperation, the court
found that the NRC’s actions were consistent with U.S. foreign policy;178 to
the court, it was Congress’s intent under NEPA that bilateral or multilateral

171. During the Cold War, states adopted numerous treaty-based agreements targeting
nuclear testing in response to environmental consequences that this testing posed. The cross
border pollution, dangers to human health, and the perception of threat to global security
created the political will to attack the problem of testing nuclear weapons. See Winston P.
Nagan & Erin K. Slemmens, National Security Policy and Ratification of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 12–13 (2009).
172. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 647 F.2d at 1383 (“NRC has concluded that risk to
the global commons, if existent at all, is bound to be negligible.”).
173. Id. at 1347.
174. Id. at 1353.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1359.
178. Id. at 1366.
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cooperation between nations take precedence over unilateral American
action, here the environmental impact statement.179
2. Center for Auto Safety v. Peck
A few years later, the D.C. Circuit addressed a case that concerned a
straightforward issue of international trade benefits. In Center for Auto
Safety v. Peck,180 the Department of Transportation amended a bumper
safety standard to make it less stringent.181 One reason the agency gave for
the change was that the new standard aligned with European standards and
thus made it cheaper for American and European auto companies to
manufacture cars for both markets.182 Challengers to the regulation jumped
on this reasoning, arguing that it was impermissible for the agency to
consider international factors.183 The D.C. Circuit, with then-Circuit Judge
Scalia writing for the court, disagreed. It held that the NHTSA was relying
on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, “which instructs each federal agency
that is developing standards to ‘take into consideration international
standards and . . . if appropriate, base the standards on international
standards’” when it noted the increased “international harmonization.”184
The court went further, though, stating that, even if the statute had not
mentioned international factors—and even though the NHTSA itself noted
that the Trade Agreements Act did not require selecting “the standard that
best promoted [international] harmonization”—the attack on the agency’s
consideration of international trade “seems to us questionable, since
harmonization produces public benefits by promoting international
commerce.”185
While the court’s statement was dicta, it nevertheless suggests that the
judges were favorably predisposed to allowing agencies to consider gains
from international trade as a factor when their enabling statutes were silent
on the matter.
3. AMSC Subsidiary Corp. v. FCC
In a 2000 case, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s decision to license
mobile satellite systems based in part on international considerations.186
For decades before the case, many nations had regulatory schemes that
afforded monopoly power over the satellite systems in their jurisdictions.187
179. Id. at 1348.
180. 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
181. Id. at 1342.
182. Id. at 1367 (“Finally, NHTSA noted that the less restrictive standard would increase
international harmonization.”).
183. Id. at 1367–68 (“Petitioners assert that this is irrelevant to the requirements of the
Cost Savings Act.”).
184. Id. at 1368.
185. Id.
186. AMSC Subsidiary Corp. v. FCC, 216 F.3d 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
187. In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission’s Regulatory Policies to Allow
Non-U.S. Licensed Space Stations to Provide Domestic and International Satellite Service in
the United States, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 24,094, 24,097 (Nov. 26, 1997).
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In 1997, the United States joined a WTO agreement requiring nations to
abandon their monopolies and authorize foreign firms to serve customers if
there was adequate spectrum for local and foreign firms to operate.188 The
agreement was designed to produce positive global spillover effects from
innovation in the field. Pursuant to the agreement, the FCC amended its
procedures to establish that it will grant licenses to foreign satellite
operators if such a license is in the public interest, which includes a
consideration of “foreign policy[] and trade issues.”189 Notably, these
international factors were not expressly authorized in the agency’s enabling
statute.190
When a foreign satellite system applied for a license, the FCC granted the
license over the objections of AMSC Subsidiary Corp., a U.S. operator. In
particular, AMSC’s objections were that the FCC, through its foreign
licensing, harmed its ability to meet its future spectrum needs.191 The
agency concluded that denying the license “would be inconsistent with U.S.
market access commitments in the WTO Agreement” and that granting
“these applications will serve the public interest by facilitating increased
competition in the mobile satellite services market.”192
In terms of the taxonomy, the agency relied on international law and
concerns over international spillover effects in its licensing decision. The
D.C. Circuit upheld the agency’s consideration of international factors as
part of an “adequate explanation” necessary to support the agency’s
action.193
4. National Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA
In 2007, the D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA’s consideration of an
international agreement. In National Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v.
EPA,194 the EPA had set standards for airplane emissions in order to match
international standards.195 If the EPA had not updated its standards, the
United States would have been out of compliance with an international
convention that it had signed.196 An advocacy group wanted the EPA to
enact standards that were more stringent than the international standards,
188. AMSC, 216 F.3d at 1157 (“The adoption by the United States in 1997 of the WTO
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services, however, obligated the United States to
open its satellite markets to foreign systems licensed by other WTO member countries.”).
189. Id.
190. 47 U.S.C. §§ 308(b), 309 (2012).
191. AMSC, 216 F.3d at 1159.
192. 14 FCC Rcd. 20,798, 20,799, 20,813 (Nov. 30, 1999).
193. AMSC, 216 F.3d at 1160.
194. 489 F.3d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
195. Id. at 1223–24 (noting that the EPA “issued a final rule increasing the stringency of
the oxides of nitrogen . . . emission standards applicable to newly certified commercial
aircraft gas turbine engines under § 231 of the Clean Air Act.”).
196. Id. at 1225 (stating that “‘by virtue of being a party to’ the Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, the United States
is a member of the United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization,” which is an
organization under the United Nations comprised of 189 member countries, tasked with
adopting harmonized security standards).
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but the EPA protested that studying those standards would have taken too
much time and pushed the EPA far past the deadline for compliance with
the international standards.197 The group responded that the EPA’s
enabling statute, which was silent as to international considerations, did not
allow the EPA to rely on factors such as international compliance.198
The D.C. Circuit sided with the EPA, stating that it “refused ‘to infer
from congressional silence an intention to preclude the agency from
considering factors other than those listed in a statute’”199 and holding that
the EPA could consider “international standards.”200 The court found that
Congress had “delegated expansive authority to EPA to enact appropriate
regulations applicable to the emission of air pollutants from aircraft
engines,” and because the EPA’s rule was not “manifestly contrary to the
statute,” the court deferred to the EPA’s reasoning and standards.201 In
terms of the taxonomy of international considerations, the court upheld the
agency’s consideration of an international agreement designed to control
regulatory spillover effects.
5. International Union, United Mine Workers of America
v. Mine Safety Health Administration
Most recently, an international factor was raised in a case about the
regulatory standard governing the volume of mine refuge chambers.202 In
International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Mine Safety
Health Administration, the acting agency, the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA), had promulgated a safety standard regarding
rescue chambers for miners that was laxer than the mine workers union
wanted.203 However, the standard was in line with international standards.
In upholding MSHA’s standard, the court cited the consistency with
international standards as one valid reason in support of the rule.204 The
court seemed to invoke international consistency as evidence of the
197. Id. at 1225–26 (“But [the EPA] reasons that ‘assess[ing] the costs (and emission
benefits) of more stringent standards’ would have required additional time that EPA did not
then have ‘since [it had] already gone past the implementation date of the [international]
standards.’” (quoting Control of Air Pollution From Aircraft and Aircraft Engines, 70 Fed.
Reg. 69,664, 69,675, 69,677–78 (Nov. 17, 2005)).
198. Id. at 1229 (stating that the group argued that the Clean Air Act “is intended to
promote the ‘public health [and] welfare,’ not to ‘establish[ ] consistency with international
standards’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(A) (1996))).
199. Id. at 1230 (quoting George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 623–24 (D.C.
Cir. 1998)).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety Health Admin., 626 F.3d
84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
203. Id. at 89–90.
204. Id. at 97 (noting that the “15 cubic feet [standard] was consistent with international
standards”). Interestingly, the agency had not based its standard on international
consistency. Instead, international consistency was listed as a benefit in comments
submitted to the agency. Id. at 97 n.6. Nevertheless, the fact that the court noticed these
comments and cited the international consistency as a benefit suggests that it viewed
international consistency as a legitimate factor that supported the agency action.
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practicability and potential reasonableness of MSHA’s standards—that is,
the court treated consistency with the international standard as a valid
epistemic factor.
* * *
In sum, in several cases dating back to 1981, the D.C. Circuit has issued
opinions in which the court has presumed or suggested that agencies can
justify their decisions based on various kinds of international network
effects, spillover effects, epistemic factors, and foreign affairs factors.
Taken together, these cases strongly suggest that agencies can
presumptively consider international factors, at least in the most important
circuit for administrative law purposes.
C. International Considerations and Massachusetts v. EPA
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA. Some have
offered broad readings of the case that would seem to upend the
presumption in favor of international factors established by the D.C.
Circuit. I suggest narrower readings, based in part on the taxonomy
developed in Part I of this Article, that largely maintain this presumption. I
do not claim that these narrower readings are superior under some theory of
legal interpretation, but rather that they are reasonable and plausible
interpretations of Massachusetts v. EPA’s holding that attorneys and courts
must take seriously.
This section first recounts the relevant aspects of Massachusetts v. EPA.
While I have referred to the case earlier in the Article, the discussion here
draws on the facts directly relevant to the doctrinal discussion. This section
then discusses several possible interpretations of the case. It concludes by
discussing the important normative consequences if courts were to accept
the narrowest reading of the case suggested here.
1. Massachusetts v. EPA
In Massachusetts v. EPA,205 a group of states, local governments, and
private organizations filed a rulemaking petition to the EPA to regulate the
emissions of four greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles, including
carbon dioxide, pursuant to the EPA’s responsibility under the Clean Air
Act.206 Under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA shall
prescribe and revise “standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.”207
The EPA denied the rulemaking petition, citing two reasons for its
denial: first, the EPA stated that the Clean Air Act did not authorize the

205. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
206. Id. at 505.
207. Id. at 506 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).

1948

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

agency to issue mandatory regulations to address global climate change,
and second, even if the EPA had the authority, it would be unwise to do
so.208 The EPA cited a handful of reasons why it would be unwise to
promulgate regulations regarding greenhouse emissions, but one was “that
regulating greenhouse gases might impair the President’s ability to
negotiate with ‘key developing nations.’”209
Although the Supreme Court noted that it had “neither the expertise nor
the authority to evaluate these policy judgments,” the Court nonetheless
rejected the foreign policy rationale, as well as the EPA’s argument that it
lacked authority to promulgate rulemaking; the Court held that the EPA’s
enabling statute required the agency to act pursuant to the petition and to
base its decision on “scientific judgment,” which made the foreign policy
considerations impermissible rationales.210
However, in the same
paragraph, the Court implied that the lack of statutory authority could have
been remedied if the EPA’s foreign policy judgments were based on
consultations with the Department of State.211 In the Court’s words:
“Congress authorized the State Department—not EPA—to formulate
United States foreign policy with reference to environmental matters
relating to climate . . . [and] EPA has made no showing that it issued the
ruling in question here after consultation with the State Department.”212
2. Several Possible Interpretations of Massachusetts v. EPA
There are several possible interpretations of Massachusetts v. EPA with
regard to its impact on which international considerations are presumptively
permissible for an agency to consider.
a. The Broad Interpretation of Massachusetts v. EPA
A prevailing broad reading of the case is that it prohibits agencies from
considering seemingly all foreign policy rationales, such as how agency
actions impact U.S. foreign relationships, reputation, and negotiations.
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, read the majority opinion in this way
and castigated the Court for going against established practice: “The
reasons EPA gave are surely considerations executive agencies regularly
take into account (and ought to take into account) when deciding whether to
consider entering a new field: the impact such entry would have on other
Executive Branch programs and on foreign policy.”213

208. Id. at 511.
209. Id. at 533–34 (quoting 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003)). For a
discussion of how the case had broad supranational implications, see Hari M. Osofksy, The
Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in Massachusetts v. EPA, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 233
(2007).
210. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533–34.
211. Id. at 534.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Similarly, Professor Kathryn Watts has suggested that Massachusetts v.
EPA extends State Farm’s rejection of impermissible political factors to
foreign policy rationales.214 Watts argues against the normative desirability
of such a holding, but as a descriptive matter writes that “Massachusetts
loudly reiterates the message that State Farm has been read to have
established more than twenty years earlier: agencies must justify their
decisions in expert-driven, not political, terms if they wish to convince
courts that reasoned decisionmaking has occurred.”215 Professor Mark
Seidenfeld disagrees with Watts normatively but concedes that
descriptively “she is correct that [Massachusetts v. EPA and other] cases do
not invite agencies to proffer political influence as a factor in arbitrary and
capricious [or hard look] review.”216 Professors Adrian Vermeule and Jody
Freeman have similarly described how the holding lends itself to this kind
of interpretation. They read the Court as establishing that the EPA, and
presumably acting agencies in similar cases, “may not consider extraneous
non-statutory factors such as foreign policy.”217
Under these readings, the Court is viewed as establishing that foreign
policy considerations are presumptively not allowed unless Congress
clearly signals otherwise in the statute—contrary to the presumption the
D.C. Circuit has established over the past several decades.
b. A Narrow Interpretation of Massachusetts v. EPA
Massachusetts v. EPA easily lends itself to narrower interpretations,
though. If we apply the taxonomy developed in this Article, we see that the
EPA was using one particular subtype of foreign policy consideration—that
is, the effect on the United States’ international negotiating position. The
Court could be seen as prohibiting only this subtype of foreign policy
consideration and not foreign policy rationales generally.
As a policy matter, there are reasons to draw a line between this subtype
and other foreign policy rationales. When agencies consider other foreign
policy factors, they typically do so because their actions directly impact the
well-being of other nations. For example, in the first D.C. Circuit case
discussed above, the NRC considered U.S.-Filipino relations because its
decision to license the sale of nuclear material to the Philippines directly
impacted welfare in that nation.218 By contrast, when an agency considers
what its action signals to foreign nations about the United States’
negotiating position, it is considering a far more speculative and amorphous
effect. There are several steps from the signal to concrete international
outcome. The agency must first consider what other nations currently
assume about the United States’ negotiating position. It must then consider
214. See generally Watts, supra note 165.
215. Id. at 22.
216. Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 161 (2012).
217. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 97.
218. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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how its action changes those assumptions and how other nations will react
to those changes. Then, the agency must determine whether those nations’
reactions will have a significant effect on international talks or global
regulatory efforts, a ridiculously complicated calculation given the complex
nature of multinational talks.
This distinction leads to two problems. First, because the effect on
international negotiation is speculative, agencies are more likely to
miscalculate and make the wrong decision. Second, if agencies can
consider how their actions affect international negotiations, they can inject
foreign policy considerations into a range of domestic regulatory decisions
that are only tenuously connected to foreign nations and foreign affairs. In
today’s world, a host of regulatory problems are subject to ongoing, future,
or potential international talks. It would be problematic if agencies could
look to any of these talks and then make significant adjustments to domestic
regulatory actions that are not a direct product of agreements reached in
these talks. An amicus brief filed by former Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright gives voice to these two concerns.219 Albright characterized the
EPA’s international negotiations rationale as “a speculative foreign policy
concern,” and she observed that, “[g]iven the number of domestic issues
that are now the subject of international negotiation, the opportunities for
executive invocation of such a foreign policy trump are substantial.”220
c. The Narrowest Interpretation of Massachusetts v. EPA
Massachusetts v. EPA is reasonably subject to an even narrower reading
as well. Under this reading, agencies can consider how their actions affect
U.S. negotiating positions if and only if the claimed impact is based on the
expertise of a diplomatic agency like the State Department. This reading
finds support from the fact that the Court itself seemed bothered that the
“EPA has made no showing that it issued the ruling in question here after
consultation with the State Department.”221 Like the Court, Albright too
suggested that her concerns about agencies abusing foreign policy
rationales to justify arbitrary decisions would have been ameliorated had the
EPA consulted with other expert agencies. She noted that
the agency came up with its policy rationale entirely on its own, even
though it lacked the relevant expertise[, and] [n]othing in the record
suggests that the EPA consulted with the Department of State, the
National Security Council, or any other relevant agency with foreign
policy expertise, on whether its foreign policy position was
appropriate.222

219. Brief for Madeleine K. Albright As Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16–19,
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2570988 [hereinafter
Albright Brief].
220. Id. at 4.
221. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534.
222. Albright Brief, supra note 219, at 10.
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Further support for this reading comes from a federal district court in
California, which observed that the “decision in Massachusetts teaches that
when the court seeks to determine what United States foreign policy is, it
must look to sources other than EPA because EPA’s pronouncements of
what is United States foreign policy, and what constitutes interference with
that policy, are not authoritative.”223
As a practical matter, requiring agencies to consult with the Department
of State before invoking a rationale based on international negotiation
effects would help ameliorate the concerns that such rationales are too
speculative and can lead to agency abuse. If the Department of State has
been significantly involved in an agency’s decision-making process, the
foreign affairs implications of that decision are likely to have been vetted by
foreign policy experts who are less likely to miscalculate the influence of
the agency action on international negotiations. Moreover, requiring
consultation with another agency introduces procedural and substantive
costs that will deter agencies from invoking this rationale too often.
Procedurally, holding significant consultations with another agency
consumes resources. Substantively, when an acting agency gives another
agency a chance to offer significant and early input on its decisions, the
agency sacrifices some degree of decision-making autonomy because the
consulted agency can now also shape the regulatory action.224 Agencies
will want to avoid these procedural and substantive costs, thus reducing the
concern that international negotiation effects will find their way into many
run-of-the-mill domestic regulatory actions.
3. The Effects of the Narrowest Interpretation of Massachusetts v. EPA
If courts accept the narrowest interpretation suggested here, there are
clear normative consequences. Generally, such an interpretation keeps in
place the presumption that agencies can rely on international factors even
when their enabling statutes are silent on the matter. The agency will need
to consult with foreign policy experts when taking into account certain
foreign policy considerations, but otherwise the presumption remains intact.
More specifically, this reading provides a way for courts to distinguish
the EPA’s reasoning in Massachusetts v. EPA and the EPA’s reasoning in
its recent climate change action under President Obama. Recall that the
EPA has recently proposed a rule limiting greenhouse gas emissions from
new power plants, particularly coal plants, based in part on the signal it
would send about American willingness to join international efforts to fight

223. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1181 (E.D. Cal.
2007).
224. See Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 186 (2013)
(explaining how, when agencies are consulted about other agencies’ actions, the “agencies
then gain the power to influence agency actions made outside their departments”); see also
Jason Marisam, The President’s Agency Selection Powers, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 821, 835–38
(2013) (explaining how the President can mandate interagency consultation that in effect
creates a hierarchy in which the consulted agency exerts power over the acting agency).
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global climate change.225 At first glance, this reasoning appears similar to
the invalid foreign policy rationale used in Massachusetts v. EPA. But
unlike the EPA’s decision-making process in that case, the EPA this time
has consulted with foreign policy experts. The EPA based its foreign policy
rationales on recommendations developed by Obama’s Interagency Task
Force on Carbon Capture and Storage, a group that included the
Department of State.226
Under the reading that I have offered of the Court’s holding in
Massachusetts v. EPA, this distinction is enough for a court to hold that the
EPA’s consideration of how its cap on emissions from coal plants would
impact international negotiations is a permissible factor that contributes to a
satisfactory explanation supporting the action.
I am not claiming here that this narrowest reading and the holdings it
would produce are the best based on some normative metric. Rather, my
claim is that this interpretation is a reasonable and plausible reading of
Massachusetts v. EPA that courts and agencies should take seriously.
Narrowness is often a virtue in legal interpretation.227 Narrowness is
especially valuable when broader readings would upend longstanding legal
understandings, as they would here. The Supreme Court has remarked that
“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme
in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide
elephants in mouseholes.”228 The same could be said of the Supreme
Court—that is, the Court should not be presumed to make fundamental
changes to legal practice and doctrine in vague terms. The narrowest
interpretation of Massachusetts v. EPA honors this maxim by reading the
case’s vague holding to make the smallest possible change to established
D.C. Circuit precedent.

225. See EPA, supra note 1.
226. See REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON CARBON CAPTURE STORAGE
(2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ccs/CCS-Task-ForceReport-2010.pdf. The task force concluded that taking regulatory actions and other steps
domestically that demonstrate leadership on issues of carbon capture and sequestration
would help “engag[e] large, coal-dependent emerging economies with rapidly expanding
power sectors to avoid locking in inefficient, high [greenhouse gas] emission power
generation assets for decades.” Id. at 91.
227. See, e.g., David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s
Protection of Self-Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 86 (2012); Paul W. Kahn,
Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1154
(1993) (“When a non-textual constitutional right is of such longstanding recognition that it
cannot be abandoned, the Court must base its interpretation on the narrowest possible
reading of the relevant tradition.”); Michael J. Perry, Correspondence, 33 STAN. L. REV.
1190, 1191 (1981) (“Instead, my argument is based on the narrowest possible coherent
reading of the Court’s opinion in Roe.”).
228. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). See generally Jacob
Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19
(2010).
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CONCLUSION
The internationalization of agency actions has become a mainstream
phenomenon. The Federal Register is replete with agency actions based in
part on international considerations. This trend will only become more
important as the world becomes increasingly globalized and regulators in
different nations have greater incentives to coordinate their regulations.229
This Article has contributed to our understanding of the internationalization
of agency actions in several ways. First, it developed a comprehensive
taxonomy of international factors relied on by agencies. Second, it
developed a stylized model of agency decision making to better understand
how agencies consider whether and when to coordinate their standards with
foreign and international regulatory standards. Third, from an institutional
design perspective, it showed that there is a trade-off between coordination
and bargaining advantage. Domestic institutions can be designed to
promote international coordination by agencies or to afford U.S. agencies
bargaining power over their foreign counterparts but not both at the same
time. Fourth, it clarified the legal doctrine on when agencies can rely on
international factors to justify their actions under judicial review. In
particular, it suggested a new interpretation of Massachusetts v. EPA that
keeps in place a presumption in favor of allowing agencies to rely on
international factors, even in the absence of express congressional
authorization.

229. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72
MD. L. REV. 773, 792 (2013) (“Governance of energy is slowly becoming formally
international, however, as more electricity flows within transnational regions.”).

